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Abstract
In  this  paper  we  estimate  the  effect  of  teachers’  wages  on  students'  achievement  in  a
developing country. We use test scores of pupils enrolled in the 8th grade of primary school,
surveyed  in 2001  in  Brazil.  We regress  individual  student test  scores on  gross  monthly
teacher  wages  allowing  for  nonlinearities.  Given  the  strong  heterogeneity  of  Brazilian
pupils and teachers, we estimate quantile regressions (QR), which  provide,  instead  of  a
constant mean coefficient, a detailed characterization of the effect of teachers' wages on
conditional pupils' scores. For the same reason, we also run separate regressions for private
and public schools. We then account for potential endogeneity of teachers' wages through
the estimation of instrumental variables models (IV). Finally, we estimate two-stage least
absolute  deviation  models  (2SLAD),  that  allow  us  to  cope  simultaneously  with  the
heterogeneity  of  the  student-teacher  relationship  and  with  the  endogeneity  of  teachers'
wages. Our results show that wages of language teachers have a small, but positive and
significant effect, on student test scores in private schools, controlling for endogeneity, but
that they are insignificant, or even negative, in public schools. We also observe that teacher
wages show a decreasing effect as we move along the conditional distribution of scores. The
same effects are found  for mathematics teachers, but the results are  less robust and the
coefficients are smaller.
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1.  Introduction: teachers wages as inputs in the education
production function
Despite all recent technological advances, schooling remains essentially a labor-intensive sector.
Indeed, wages still represent the most important share of educational budgets in many countries.
For example, in 2001, wages of teachers and other schooling staff together represented 77% of total
expenditures on primary and secondary education in Brazil (OECD, 2001). The efficacy of these
expenditures in improving student achievement is therefore of high policy relevance.
In the economics of education literature, a teacher's wage is often taken as a proxy for his level of
competence. It is usually assumed that better workers are better rewarded so that the wage is an
indicator of their productivity. The most commonly used justification for this assumption is that
more  qualified  and  more  capable  individuals  face  a  choice  between  working  as  a  teacher  or
working in another sector (Southwick & Indermit, 1997; Dolton & Van der Klaauw, 1999; Angrist
&  Guryan,  2003).  Too  low  relative  wages  in  the  educational  sector  would  create  an  adverse
selection  problem,  leading  less-able  graduates  to  choose  to  become  teachers  and  lowering  the
overall  level of teacher quality (Hoxby  & Leigh, 2003).  Alternatively,  one  could  assume  there
exists some form of reward to merit in the teaching profession that would tend to increase the
wages of better teachers. The latter assumption requires the existence of a competitive market for
teachers.  This  is  certainly  not  obvious  in  many  settings,  especially  when  we  recall  that  a
considerable fraction of many schooling systems is run by the state. In public schools, teachers'
wages are typically determined by age, tenure, political indications and other factors not necessarily
related to merit or productivity. Therefore, there is no financial incentive for the best teachers to
stay in the educational sector since they may have better career prospects in other economic sectors
(Lenkford & Wyckoff, 1997).
In Brazil, a private schooling system co-exists with a public one. In the former, there is a 'free
market' for teachers: recruitment procedures and wage settings are decided on a decentralized basis,
subject to  some  constraints  imposed  by  unions  and  collective  bargaining  rules.  Each  school  is
considerably free to make decisions related to teacher hiring and performance rewarding. Contrary
to what happens in the private system, in the public system there is no free market for teachers.
Recruitment  should  in  principle  be  done  by  means  of  public  contests,  but  many  teachers  are
indicated to their jobs by politicians or by other means. Wages are determined according to general
guidelines stated by the federal authority (ministry of education), but mainly by state-level and/or
municipal-level decision-makers. Public schools cannot  decide  autonomously  to  pay  higher3
salaries in order to attract better teachers, nor to reward such teachers, who are supposedly the ones
who could lead pupils to attain better performance. Thus we expect to find stronger correlations
between teacher wages and pupils achievement in the private system than in the public one.
It is a much-debated topic in the empirical literature whether investing in resources such as teacher
wages  can  improve  student  performance.  A  common  finding  is  that  resources  do  not  have  a
significant effect on student test scores (Hanushek, 1986; 1997; 2002), but such a conclusion has
frequently been questioned (Card & Krueger, 1992; Figlio, 1999). Particularly, the effect of relative
wages is usually more significant than the absolute teacher wage (Southwick & Indermit, 1997) but
both variables have a weak and not very robust effect on student scores (Dewey et al., 2000).
The  purpose  of  our  paper  is  to  assess  the  effect  of  teachers'  wages  on  student  performance,
exploiting the features of Brazil, a developing country in which the variation in teacher wages is
particularly marked, as we will show later. The underlying reasoning is that it could be the case that
in  industrialized  countries  teachers’  wages  have  reached  a  threshold  above  which  there  is  not
enough variation as to measure an effect of a change in wages on student performance. In a poorer
country where the dispersion in wages is much higher, the level of teachers' wages might have a
more significant effect, at least in the private schooling system (Case and Deaton, 1999).
We  essentially  test  three  hypotheses  in  this  paper:  (i)  that  teachers  wages  matter  for  students
achievement, (ii) that the conditional correlation of teachers wages and scores is stronger in private
than in public schools, given that the latter are imposed a greater number of constraints on their
recruitment and payment policies, and (iii) that there are variations in the conditional correlation of
teachers wages with students test scores, indicating that there is heterogeneity in the pupil-teacher
relationship.
The paper  is organized as  follows. Section 2  is  devoted to the  presentation  of  our  data  and  a
discussion of the variables we use. We then estimate an education production function, first by
ordinary least-squares (OLS), which serves as our baseline reference (section 3). Given the high
heterogeneity of Brazilian pupils and teachers, in section 4 we turn to the estimation of quantile
regressions  (QR),  which  provide  a  detailed  characterization  of  the  effect  of  teachers  wages
(explanatory variable) along the distribution of pupils scores (dependent variable). This technique
contrasts with OLS and IV estimations, which only provide mean conditional correlations of the
explanatory and the dependent variables. Even including a series of controls, OLS coefficients risk
being  biased,  since  it  is  difficult  to  defend  the  assumption  that  students  of  different  levels  of
performance are randomly assigned to teachers of different wages. In order to address this likely
endogeneity issue, we use a set of variables, including teachers’ experience and teachers’ gender, as4
instruments for the teachers' wage (IV: section 5). Finally, we try to cope simultaneously  with
heterogeneity  in  the  teacher-student  relationship  and  endogeneity  of  teachers'  wages  through  a
combination of two-stage least squares and QR, in the so-called two-stage least absolute deviation
estimation (2SLAD: section 6). Section 7 contains a summary and the conclusions.
2.  Data set and choice of variables
2.1. The SAEB database
The data we use come from the 2001 Brazilian survey on pupils' achievement, the so-called SAEB,
which stands for Basic Education Assessment System. SAEB is organized by INEP, a research
institute  subordinated  to  the  Brazilian  Ministry  of  Education
1.  SAEB  consists  of  countrywide
cognitive ability exams in language (Portuguese) and mathematics, coupled with a collection of
data on relevant features of students, teachers, principals, and schools. It focuses on the evaluation
of pupils at three key stages of their formal education: 4th year of primary school, 8th year of
primary school, and 3rd year of secondary school. Each of these grades corresponds to the last year
of a stage in the Brazilian schooling system. These are the end of  first half of primary  school
(during which students have one teacher for all subjects), the end of second half of primary school
(during which students have one teacher for each subject), and the end of secondary school (after
which students can do college admission exams).
Schooling  is  mandatory  in Brazil  for children up to 14 years, regardless of  the  grade  they  are
attending.  The  8
th  grade  sample  constitutes  the  best  available  approximation  to  the  end  of
compulsory schooling. Moreover, the 8
th grade sample is also less exposed to dropping out than the
3
rd  grade  of  secondary  school.  Finally,  the  8
th  grade  datasets  have  fewer  missing  data  in  key
questions (e.g. pupil’s age, mother’s education, number of books at home etc.) as compared to the
4
th grade dataset. For these reasons, in this paper, we decided to focus exclusively on the 8
th grade
sample. It should be noted, however, that while the recommended age for pupils enrolled in the 8
th
grade is 14 years, the range of pupils’ ages in the sample is actually quite wide.
The  SAEB  database  surveys  random  samples.  For  each  grade  and  subject,  the  sample  is
representative of the students of the whole country, and of each of the 26 Brazilian states and the
Federal District (in which is located country’s capital, Brasilia). In a first step, schools that took
part in SAEB have been randomly chosen. In a second step, one class has then been randomly
chosen inside each of these schools. All students of a given class have been submitted to the SAEB
                                                       
1 In Portuguese, SAEB stands for Sistema de Avaliação do Ensino Básico. INEP stands for Instituto Nacional de
Estudos e Pesquisas Educacionais (In English: National Institute for Educational Studies and Research).5
exam on only one of the two subjects,  which  means  that  a  particular  pupil  could  not  do  both
language  and  mathematics  tests.  Pupils'  test  scores  correspond  to  subject-specific  pedagogical
scales elaborated by INEP staff together with teachers, researchers and experts. Possible scores
range from 0 to 500, and are supposed to evaluate skills and abilities of students. Scores are not
comparable across subjects.
2.2. Choice of control variables
Tables 1 (language) and 2 (mathematics) contain descriptive statistics for all variables used in the
estimations for all schools taken together and for each type of school: private, municipal public
schools, and state-level public schools. We recall that they refer to the 2001 wave of SAEB, to both
language and mathematics tests, and to the 8
th grade.
Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics of the dependent and the explanatory variables expressed
both in their original units (ntscore and ntwageprof), that is before unit transformations undertaken
for ease of interpretation (explained below). By looking at ‘ntscore’ and ‘ntwageprof’, we verify
the high variability of both scores and teachers wages. In both subjects, while the average scores
are not far from 250, the range of scores is quite wide (e.g. minimum score of 78, 21 and maximum
score of 399,03 in mathematics). Teachers' wages range from 0,5 to 15 s.m., the monetary unit used
here
2,  and  standard  deviations  are  substantial
3.  Standard  deviations  of  both  dependent  and
explanatory variables are higher in private with respect to public schools.
The remaining rows show descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our estimations: the
dependent  variable  (score),  the  explanatory  variable  (wageprof),  and  the  control  variables.
Appendix 2 explains in detail how the explanatory variable has been constructed. The important
point is that it has been created out of a transformation of the original information we had, such that
the new variable has mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1. The dependent variable, i.e.
the student's test score, was standardized in order to have a mean of 500, and a standard deviation
of 100.
Following Carroll (1963) and subsequent literature
4, there are five factors that determine students
learning rate: ''(i) aptitude, (ii) ability to understand instructions, (iii) perseverance, (iv) opportunity,
and (v) the quality of instruction''. We use these categories as a reference for the choice of our
                                                       
2 The monetary unit used here is that one in which wages are expressed in Brazilian administration, namely ‘s.m.’,
which stands for 'salários mínimos', (literally, ‘minimum wages'). One unit of s.m. was approximately equivalent to
US$68,00 in October 2001, when SAEB exams took place. See Appendix 2 for further explanations.
3 The range is the same for both subjects because this variable has been composed out of the same categorical question
concerning their wages that has been posed to all teachers regardless of the discipline that they teach. See Appendix 2
for further explanations
4 Creemer, 1994; Scheerens, 1997; Creemers et al., 20006
control variables among all the information available on the pupil itself, on its family, its teacher
and its school.
Firstly, to account for observable individual characteristics (potentially related to points i to iv),
we include age, gender and race of the pupil. There is a broad range of ages inside the considered
grade (pupils are aged between 8 and 14 in the 8
th grade). We can therefore expect age to affect
motivation,  self-confidence  and  maturity  of  the  pupils.  We  include  dummies  for  self-reported
pupil’s race (black and mixed). Since, on average, mixed  individuals are poorer than whites  in
Brazil, and blacks are the poorest race group, this dummy not only plays the role of a control for
unobserved  variables  related  to  pupils  race,  but  particularly,  it  is  also  a  control  for  its  socio-
economic status.
Secondly,  we  control  for  pupils  family  environment.  We  use  measures  of  mother  education
(misced), family wealth (as measured by the number of employees at home: nmaids), the number of
books at home (as a proxy for the family interest in learning and as a home educational resource:
nbbooks), and the type of family structure the pupil lives in (with both parents or not: nonnuclear).
These variables might affect the motivation, level of effort and opportunities of the pupils as well as
their ability to understand instructions.
Thirdly, to account specifically for pupil effort (point iii), we use information on the frequency
with which pupils does their homework when asked to do it (hmwk)
5. We also have information as
to whether the pupil repeated grades (retention) and how often. We use this variable as an imperfect
control for past effort, while we are aware that this complex variable also reflects innate talent and
family background.
Fourthly, we include measures of the quality of schooling (point v) received by pupils. We have
information on the size of classes, (the student/teacher ratio: stratio), the availability of a library in
the school (library) and the number of computers available for pupil use (ncomp)
6. Moreover, we
include the gross monthly wage of the principal as a control for his overall level of competence
(wageprinc).
                                                       
5 One could fear that the quantity of homework given by the teacher is either endogenous (unobserved characteristics
influence both pupils homework records and their scores, simultaneously), or even as an outcome variable (well-paid
teachers possibly have an impact, not only the score of pupils, but also on their homework activities). It should be noted
that the variable measures the frequency with which pupils do their homework, and not simply the frequency with they
are given homework. That is, the value this variable assumes depends primarily on a choice made by pupils, so
classifying this variable as an outcome variable is not so straightforward. Simultaneous determination might be of
concern, but we decided to keep this variable in the model for two reasons: (i) because it is just a control and not our
main focus, (ii) it is the only variable indicating effort that is available in the SAEB dataset.
6 We don’t have information on the number of students in each school, so we were not able to generate the ideal
variable that would be the number of computers per head in each school.7
Finally, we add controls for regional specificities of the environment. We use indicator variables
for  each  Brazilian  state (uf11  to  uf53),  aimed  at  capturing  all  state-specific  heterogeneity.  We
include municipal information on tax revenues per head (taxpercap) to take into account variations
in  economic  resources  that  could  influence  both  student  performance  and  teachers  wages,
independently of their actual productivity level. For instance, wealthier municipalities could give
access to public libraries, health services or other aid to families and on average parents’ earnings
would tend to be higher than in poorer municipalities.
As for teachers characteristics we assume that, conditional on having or not a university degree
(univprof), all otherwise relevant characteristics related to teachers quality are synthesized by their
wages. Other observed teachers variables are used as predetermined instruments in IV and 2SLAD
estimations:  teachers’  gender  (gendprof),  teachers’  experience  in  teaching  the  tested  discipline
(expprof), monthly hours of work (hoursprof) and a dummy indicating whether the teacher has
another job besides teaching (otherjob) .
3.  Do teachers’ wages matter? The baseline model (OLS)
3.1. Model and explanatory variables
Our  basic  model  estimates  an  education  production  function  for  scores  that  8
th  grade  pupils
obtained in SAEB tests, in both subjects: language and mathematics. Test scores are a function of
teachers' gross monthly wages, controlling for the factors described in the previous section. Our
OLS (benchmark) model is as follows:
Scorei = α + βWi + γXi + δX²i + εi  (Equation 1)
Where: Score is the performance of pupil i in SAEB test, W stands for each teacher's wage, X is a
vector of control variables and ε is the error term.
Note that by including in the equation a vector (X²) containing the squares of the continuously
valued right-hand side variables, we avoid imposing the restrictive assumption of linearity in the
relationship  between  right-hand  side  variables  and  the  outcome  variable  (score),  a  procedure
inspired  by  Figlio (1999). In subsection 3.1 we explain why we use the specification stated in
equation 1 and not a more general one, which would include a squared teachers' wages term (W²).
Test score observations have been standardized such that the mean for this variable is 500, with a
standard deviation of 100 (variable name: score). And teachers wages observations have been set to
have a mean equal to 0 and a standard deviation equal to 1 (variable name: wageprof). Thanks to
these  transformations,  we  can  interpret  the estimated effects of teacher wages on scores in8
an intuitive way. For example, a marginal effect of 10 would  mean that a change of 1 unit of
teachers wages (that is, 1 standard deviation of teachers wages) corresponds with a change of 10
points of pupils score (that is, 10% of standard deviation of pupils scores).
In addition to the estimations  for the overall  sample,  we  also  estimate  our  models  for  private,
municipal,  and  state  schools  separately.  There  are  several  reasons  for  doing  so.  First  of  all,  it
appears  that  there  are  important  differences  between  public  and  private  schools.  In  the
descriptive statistics by type of school (tables 1 and 2) we observe that average scores of private
schools students are between 15 to 20 percent higher than those of public schools. We also notice
that, on average, private schools teachers earn 30% more than their public counterparts. When we
turn to control variables, the differences are also striking. For example, pupils in private schools
live much less often in non-nuclear families (27 compared to 40 per cent in public schools), have
highly  educated  mothers  (on  average,  mothers  of  students  in  private  schools  have  been  to
university, mothers of students in public schools have not), live in wealthier families with more
books and do more homework. Private school infrastructure and wages are also much better than
those of the public sector. Private schools directors earn, on average, 30% more than their public
schools counterparts and private schools have, on average, 23 computers for pupil use compared to
less than 5 for public schools.
Of course, these differences in average values of dependent, explanatory and control variables do
not make the case for partitioning the sample – indeed, these differences are controlled for in our
estimations  –,  but  they  constitute  evidences  that  private  and  public  schools  function  in  very
contrasted environments. We believe that, beyond these observable variables, there might also
exist unobservable heterogeneity of pupil's characteristics from one type of school to another. This
leads  us  to  think  that  in  Brazil,  private  and  public  schools  function  in  completely  different
environments, and are allocated completely different mixes of inputs (particularly, of inputs such as
pupils and teachers characteristics).
Another reason why we think it is interesting to look at private and public schools separately relates
to their respective funding and managing characteristics. Private schools are neither financed nor
managed by the public authority, which significantly modifies their decision-making environment
and the nature of their budget constraints. As mentioned previously, private schools function in
competition with other schools in the educational market, whereas public schools are managed by
the state and respond to bureaucratic rules.
As a consequence, we believe that the effect on student scores of an important input like teachers'
wages  should  not  be  estimated  (only)  by  taking  the  whole  sample  and  assuming  a  constant9
coefficient for all types of schools. It seems worthwhile to gain some insights about this kind of
heterogeneity, of both regressors and scores, by separately estimating private and public schools
coefficients.
Although they are not as strong as those between private and public schools, there are also some
relevant differences among public schools. Municipal  and  state  schools  differ  mainly  in  their
degree of decision-making autonomy (decentralization). Whereas public schools are  funded and
managed mainly at the local level (there are 5562 municipalities in Brazil), state schools are funded
and managed mainly at a higher level (there are 27 states in the country). Consequently, to be
consistent we decided to partition the public schools sample as well.
Therefore we estimate our models for all schools taken together, but also separately for the three
types of schools – private, municipal and state schools. In order to keep results comparable when
we use partitioned samples, we standardize the dependent variable (test score: ‘score’) and the
explanatory variable (teacher’s wage: wageprof) by subset, such that means and standard deviations
are set, respectively, to 500 and 100, and to 0 and 1 for each type of school.
3.2. OLS results
F tests of structural change
7 inform us that we can reasonably reject the null hypothesis that the
coefficient  δ,  associated  with  the  vector  of  squared  control  variables,  is  equal  to  zero.  This
conclusion holds for both subjects when all schools are taken together. However, we cannot reject
the null hypotheses that the coefficients associated with the square of teacher’s wage (W²) are equal
to zero. These tests suggest that the specification we use here (linear in W and nonlinear in X) is
more adequate than the linear functional form usually employed in education production functions.
These results are in line with those obtained by Figlio (1999). In the remaining of the paper, we will
make use of this specification, stated in equation 1 above.
8
Tables 3 and 4 show, for language and mathematics respectively, the results of OLS estimations of
the impact of teachers' wages on scores, undertaken according to equation 1, namely, conditional
on a series of controls. For each of the two subjects – language and mathematics – we present
results for all schools taken together, and also for each type of school.
In this baseline (OLS) model, teacher wages have a small but positive and significant (at 1% level)
effect on  student test  scores,  when  all  schools  are  taken  together. In  the  language  sample,  the
coefficient is of 3,30, which means that a change of 1 unit in teachers wages (that is, 1 standard
                                                       
7 See table 5.
8 When each type of school is treated separately, the most flexible model, namely the one which is nonlinear in both W
and X, in some cases is preferred to the one we chose (linear in W, nonlinear in X), especially in municipal schools.
However, we decided to stick to the same specification across models in order to make our comparisons clearer.10
deviation of teachers wages) corresponds to a change of 3,30 points of pupils score (that is, 3,30%
of  standard  deviation  of  pupils  scores).  A  similar  result  is  obtained  in  mathematics,  but  the
coefficient is smaller (2,38). The coefficients associated with the private school dummy
9 (private)
are positive and very high in both subjects.
Tables 3 and 4 also contain the results for the partitioned samples. The picture we obtain is quite
different depending on the type of school. For both subjects, teachers’ wages coefficients in private
schools are considerably  higher than those of the whole sample (6,99  in  language  and  4,02  in
mathematics) and both are significant. For municipal schools, the more decentralized type of public
school, teacher wage coefficients are not statistically different from zero in both subjects. The same
is  true  for  state  schools  in  language,  while  in  mathematics  the  coefficient  is  positive  (3,14),
statistically significant, and higher than the one associated with the all the schools taken together.
So the effect of teacher wages on student test scores for the whole sample seems lower than that for
private schools due to both types of public schools coefficients in the language exam, and only
because of municipal schools in the mathematics case.
Our control variables yield the expected signs, in line with standard results found in the literature.
Boys perform better than girls do in mathematics and the reverse is true in language. Age and grade
retention both affect test scores negatively. Self-reported black and mixed pupils perform worse on
average, as well as individuals coming from non-nuclear families, and those that have fewer books
at home. Having a teacher holding a university degree (only for language scores) or the availability
of a school library (only for public schools) affect test-scores positively as well as having access to
computers  at  school  (in  private  schools  only).  Note  that  most  public  schools  have  very  few
computers  and  less  often  a  library  than  private  schools.  This  could  explain  the  differences  in
significance of the measured effects between school types.
Our results suggest that teachers’ wages do matter for students’ achievement in Brazil, although the
estimated coefficients are not extremely high. Moreover, the hypothesis that, in private schools, the
conditional effects of teachers wages on scores are likely to be stronger than in public schools,
given that the latter are imposed a greater number of constraints on their recruitment and payment
policies, is largely supported by our OLS results.
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4.  To whom do teachers’ wages matter? The rationale for using
quantile regressions (QR)
Education  production  function  studies  typically  report  average  effects  on  student  achievement
(typically, the outcome variable) of school resources, family resources, or other relevant inputs.
Widely used methods such as least squares and instrumental variables have the drawback of not
allowing one to assess the effect of resources on achievement at different points of the conditional
distribution of educational achievement (scores), since they only estimate a constant coefficient, the
conditional mean.
However,  understanding  the  effect  of  teachers’  wages  along  the  distribution  of  scores  may  be
relevant for various reasons. It is particularly important when there are good reasons to believe that
'weak' and 'strong' students function in extremely different contexts. This is the case in the Brazilian
schooling system. Indeed Brazilian students and teachers are heterogeneous in various respects.
Firstly, this country presents one of the most unequal income distributions in the world, which is
attested, for example, by a very high Gini coefficient throughout the 1980s and the 1990s – 0,59 –
against an average of 0,50 for other Latin  American  countries  (Barros  et  al.,  2000).  Secondly,
inequality of student achievement is particularly strong in Brazil, in comparison with developed
countries and even some developing countries. According to usual measures of inequality such as
the ratio between the first and the ninth deciles of scores or educational Gini, Brazil ranks last (i.e.
most unequal country) in an  international student assessment exam, the so-called  ‘PISA 2000’,
recently organized by OECD. To sum up, the heterogeneity of pupils in Brazil is so strong that we
suspect that coefficients calculated as averages, such as those provided by OLS and IV estimations,
potentially hide insightful information. More importantly, they are likely to mislead policy-makers
by giving an incorrect diagnosis of the relative impact of some inputs, and especially of teachers’
wages, in the production of education. Indeed, we have no reason to impose, a priori, that the
coefficient associated with the explanatory variable be constant along the distribution of scores.
One way of dealing with potential heterogeneity of the relationship between Brazilian pupils and
teachers is to estimate coefficients of samples partitioned by type of school, as we do throughout
this paper. However, such a procedure has a drawback: it forces us to drop, in each estimation, a
considerable  amount  of  variation  in  both  scores  and  teachers’  wages  as  we  only  consider  the
observations related to roughly one third of the overall sample. Another strategy for dealing with
heterogeneity  consists  of  using  the  quantile  regression  technique.  Eide  and  Showalter  (1998)
advocated the use of quantile regression by saying that they "not only addressed the question 'does
money  matter?",  but  also  “for  whom  does money  matter?”.  Accordingly,  in  this  paper,12
while least squares and instrumental variables estimations allow us to answer whether teachers’
wages matter in Brazil, quantile regressions allow us to determine to whom they really matter.
Technically, quantile regressions consist of a generalization of the conditional median estimation
(or least absolute deviation), which is in fact an old statistical technique. It was left aside for many
years or only presented as a curiosity in statistical textbooks because of computational difficulties
among other reasons (Koenker, 2000). It was then "rediscovered", developed and introduced in the
economic literature by Koenker & Bassett (1978). It has been generalized as a method of estimation
of conditional quantile functions for any quantile θ of the dependent variable. When estimating
quantiles, absolute deviations are given positive and negative weights, in such a way that a fraction
θ of the observations will lie below the fitted line while a fraction (1 – θ) will lie above it. As θ goes
from 0 to 1, the entire distribution of test scores, conditional on teachers wages (W) and covariates
(X and X²), is described.
 The 
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We  thus  estimate  equation  2  for  each  quantile  we  are  interested  in  so  as  to  obtain  a  set  of
coefficients for each quantile:  q b .
4.1. Related literature and the procedure we adopted
Some  recent  papers  have  been  published  which  use  quantile  regression  to  assess  the  effect  of
resources on student achievement. Eide and Showalter (1998) estimate the effect of different types
of school resources (pupil-teacher ratio, school year length, qualification of teachers, peer effects
and per pupil expenditures) on the conditional distribution of performance (test score gains) both by
ordinary least squares and by quantile regressions. Their results show that most of the coefficients
are not statistically significant on average (i.e. by least squares estimation). However, some of them
turn out to  be  statistically  significant  for  some  specific  quantiles  when  the  quantile  regression
method is used (e.g. school year length becomes significant for upper tail of distribution).
Later on, other  papers  have  used  the  quantile  regression  technique  in  economics  of  education.
Levin (2001) studies mainly the effect of class size, but also of peer effects, on achievement of
Dutch pupils. His results show a strong downward trend in the effect of having more pupils of the
same IQ in one's class on achievement as one moves up the achievement distribution. That is, low
performing  pupils  benefit  more  from  ability grouping than average or high performing ones.13
Rangvid (2003) estimates peer effects along the conditional distribution of scores for Danish pupils,
finding that peer effects are stronger for weak students, and that they decrease over the distribution
of scores. In a setting very close to ours, Billger (2002) first uses ordinary least squares and quantile
regressions separately, and then combines instrumental variables with quantile regressions in two
stages, in order to estimate the effect of teacher pay on student performance in private schools in
the US. In the latter formulation, she finds that higher maximum salaries have no significant impact
on the measure of student performance she uses.
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to estimate education production functions through the
quantile regression technique using Brazilian data. We estimate equation 2 for 5 quantiles of the
test score distribution. We estimate the quartiles, including the median (0.25, 0.5, and 0.75) in order
to obtain a clear picture of the changing pattern of the effect of wage variables on the distribution of
scores.  It  is  also  useful  to  compare  the  median  and  the  mean  coefficients
10.  Additionally,  we
estimate two extreme quantiles (0.05 and 0.95) to give us an idea of the effect of our explanatory
variables on scores for very weak and very strong students.
4.2. QR results
Tables 6 (language) and 7 (mathematics) show QR estimations results for 5 quantiles, including a
series of control variables. For each subject, we present results for all schools taken together and for
each type of school, and we reproduce OLS coefficients for comparison. Recall that the dependent
variable is the students' test score.
When we look at all schools together, we have quite different results in language (table 6) and
mathematics  (table  7).  In  language,  the  effect  of  teachers  wages  decreases  (though  not
monotonically)  with  the  performance  of  students.  The  coefficient  drops  from  a  positive  and
significant level (5,14) for the first estimated quantile (θ=0,05) to a low coefficient (0,74) which is
not significantly different from zero for the last estimated quantile (θ=0,95). According to these
results, teachers'  wages  are  conditionally  correlated to  a  higher  extent  with  the  scores  of  low-
performing students than with those  of  high-performing  students.  In  mathematics,  such  a  clear
decreasing pattern is not observed. Coefficients are small, positive, and significant (at 10% level)
for all estimated quantiles, but they go up and down, without substantial shifts, even between the
extreme quantiles (2,21 for θ=0,05 against 2,97 for θ=0,95).
                                                       
10 The median (QR with θ =0,5) and the mean (OLS) coefficients may differ for two reasons: (i) the conditional
distribution of scores may be skewed: either there are relatively too many observations for which teachers wages are
low (implying a low median coefficient), or there are relatively too few observations for which teachers wages are low
(implying a high median coefficient), (ii) if there is a considerable number of outliers.14
There  is  a  gap  between  the  median  coefficient  (2,95)  and  the  mean  coefficient  (2,38)  in  both
disciplines, suggesting that the OLS coefficient is unsuitable to express the conditional correlation
of teachers' wages with the scores of weak students. Indeed, as the conditional distribution of scores
is skewed (to the left in the case of mathematics, to the right for language), quantile regression
should provide more precision for the estimation of the effects at different points of the distribution.
When we turn our attention to particular types of school, the most interesting result is found for
private  schools.  In  the  language  test,  all  estimated  coefficients  are  positive.  They  are  also
statistically significant, except for the last one (θ=0,95). The overall decreasing pattern verified for
all schools taken together is reproduced here, but the intensity of the estimated effect is stronger,
especially for θ=0,05, where the coefficient is 14,39. Recall that this means that a marginal change
of  1  standard  deviation  of  teachers’  wages  is  related  to  a  change  of  14,39  points  (14,39%  of
standard deviation of scores). Even for the third quartile (θ=0,75), the coefficient is much higher
than the all-schools-taken-together analogous result (5,49 versus 2,95). We notice a considerable
difference between the median (5,35) and the mean coefficient (6,99). In the mathematics test, none
of  the  extreme  quantiles  coefficients  are  statistically  different  from  zero,  while  the  three
coefficients corresponding to the quartiles are positive, statistically significant, and presenting a
slight overall decreasing trend.
For public schools, only 4 out of 20 coefficients are significant at the 10% level, only 2 at the 1%
level,  and  the  results  are  much  less  revealing.  None  of  the  municipal  schools  coefficients  is
different from zero and no clear increasing or decreasing pattern is observed. In state schools, in
both subjects, the coefficients for the high-performing students (θ=0,95) are statistically significant,
but while  it  is positive  in  mathematics (5,83), it is negative  in  language (-5,96). A  very  slight
decreasing pattern can be found in language, but in mathematics no clear-cut picture is obtained.
Detention of a university degree by the teacher improves pupil performance in language, especially
that of the better students. This result seems to indicate that a higher  level of skills  makes the
students more able to reap the benefits of having a university trained teacher. These results do not
hold for math test scores, which do not seem affected by the teacher's university education.
All other unobserved aspects of teacher quality, captured by the wages, mainly benefit the low-
performing students pointing to some form of merit pay or efficient selection of teacher candidates
especially in the private sector. We conclude that, either with the whole sample or with the private
schools sample, the hypothesis that there are variations in the conditional correlation of teachers
wages with students test scores (the heterogeneity hypothesis) is supported by the coefficients of
language  estimations.  In  mathematics,  this  is  true  as  well  but  to  a  smaller  extent.  So,  the15
achievement impact of an additional unit of teacher wage is not the same for all types of student.
5.  Correcting for endogeneity: instrumental variables (IV)
5.1. Strategy used to take endogeneity of teacher wages into account
We can not ignore the possibility that good students are assigned essentially better-paid teachers.
Individuals whose unobservable characteristics make them high-performing students may well be
those who are taught by well-paid teachers. For instance, well-paid teachers might live and work in
richer neighborhoods where students would on average perform relatively well in SAEB exams,
regardless of the quality of the teaching they are given. This could happen, for example, due to the
provision of family support working as a substitute for school inputs. If this is the case, even after
controlling for the available observable variables, the coefficients we estimate would not capture
the true effect of teachers wages (and the teachers quality they are assumed to represent) on scores.
They would measure the combined effect of teacher wages with these unobserved factors, biasing
OLS coefficients, possibly upwards.
It may also be the case, instead, that rich parents whose children are not brilliant at school make an
effort to offer their children the best available schooling. In order to do so, they could enroll their
children in expensive private schools so that well-paid teachers working there could help these not-
so-brilliant-but-rich pupils in the endeavor of acquiring a better level of academic skills. Since they
are  not  very  talented,  however,  these  students  might  obtain  test  scores  which  are  far  from
outstanding, even though their teachers earn a relatively high wage (and have a relatively high level
of skills). In this case, teachers’ wages coefficients would be excessively low because of a selection
problem, regardless of the quality of teaching that is provided.
There are certainly other possible sources of selection bias in the relationship between teachers'
wages and students' scores. Whatever the reason, one may suspect that teachers' wages are not
randomly assigned to different types of students, even conditioning on all available covariates.
Trying to account for potential endogeneity of teachers' wages, we have estimated an instrumental
variable model. In the first stage, we estimate teachers' wages as a function of the same set of
variables used in OLS and QR estimations, but also with a set of instruments that are excluded from
the main, second-stage, equation. The first step takes the following form:
Wi = η + θXi + κX²i + λI +  i  (Equation 3)
Where W stands for the teacher’s wage, X is a vector of control variables, I represents the set of
instrumental variables that are excluded in the second step (assumed to be orthogonal to scores) and16
  is the error term.
In the main equation, we exclude the instruments we assume to be predetermined with respect to
students' score, especially the gender of the teacher (gendprof) and his or her years of experience as
a teacher (expprof). Firstly, we believe that whether a teacher is a man or a woman is not a factor
that is likely to influence students’ score directly. On the other hand, there is typically a gender gap
in wages, even when experience, age and other factors are  controlled  for,  so that, on  average,
gender  is  correlated  with  wages.  Secondly,  education  production  functions  frequently  provide
evidences  that  a  teacher’s  experience,  conditional  on  covariates,  has  no  systematic  significant
impact on scores
11. But experience can be expected to be strongly correlated with wages, especially
in the public sector. So, in principle, these two variables seem to fill the required conditions for
them to be valid instruments: they are correlated with the variable we suspect to be endogenous and
they are correlated with the dependent variable of the main equation only through the channel of
the endogenous variable. The set of instruments we use also include the monthly hours of work of a
teacher (hoursprof), whether he or she has another job (otherjob), and the squares of the number of
years of experience (experience2) and of the number of hours taught per month (hoursprof2). We
use  the  same  specification  for  the  two  subjects,  all  of  these  six  instruments  being  used  as
predetermined variables.
The second step is exactly the same as the OLS specification, except for the fact that we replace the
potentially endogenous variable (wageprof) by an instrumented variable (wagehat).
Scorei = α + βWHati + δXi + ζX²i + εi  (Equation 4)
Where Score is the performance of pupil i in SAEB test, WHat stands for the predicted value of
teacher wage (based on the first stage), X is a vector of control variables and ε is the error term.
5.2. IV results
Results from the second stage of 2SLS estimations for the complete sample are found in tables 8
and 9, and they can be compared with OLS results (tables 3 and 4). As a first check of the validity
of  our  instruments,  we  look  at  the  results  of  first  stage  estimations.  In  the  first  stage,  most
coefficients of predetermined instruments are statistically significant. More interesting, though, is
to look at partial R-squared, as well as the F tests of the predetermined instruments of the first stage
regressions. The R-squared is reasonably high for all subjects and types of school (ranging from
                                                       
11 Vignoles et al.(2000)17
0,13 to 0,18) and all F tests allow us to reject the hypotheses that the coefficients of excluded
instruments are not different from zero. As a second stage check, we have  computed  Sargan’s
statistic for a test of over-identification. The test yields good results (p-values ranging from 0,28 to
0,40) in language, for all schools and for both private and  municipal  schools, but not for state
schools. In mathematics, p-values are low for overall and municipal schools, and very low for state
and private schools, casting doubts on the validity of the set of instruments. For that reason, we
concentrate our analysis on the results of the language exam.  We have  tested  some  subsets of
instruments  for  each  sample,  some  of  which  pass  the  instrument  validity  checks  and  yield
qualitatively  comparable results. However we decided to report here  only  the  results  using  the
complete set for the sake of comparison.
In the language exam, when all schools are taken together, second stage estimation yields a positive
and significant coefficient of teacher wages on test scores, as in OLS. In fact, the coefficient is
slightly higher than its OLS counterpart (4,52 versus 3,30). The same pattern is verified for private
schools, with a coefficient that is higher than the OLS one (8,30 versus 6,99), and also statistically
significant.  The  state  schools'  (more  decentralized  public  schools)  and  the  municipal  school's
teacher wage coefficients are both insignificant. Detention of a university degree by the teacher has
a significant positive effect on language test scores of a magnitude similar to the OLS specification.
In mathematics, none of the coefficients is significant. The main qualitative conclusions we had
drawn in the OLS section are thus preserved when we instrument the teacher’s wage.
6.  Quantile regressions combined with two-stage-least squares: two-
stage absolute deviation (2SLAD)
In subsection 4, we have extended the estimation of conditional mean (OLS coefficients) to the
estimation of coefficients that vary along the distribution of conditional scores, through the use of
quantile regressions. It is now natural to proceed in an analogous way, extending the IV model of
section 5 in a similar manner. The idea underlying this combination of two techniques (quantile
regression and two-stage least squares) is to cope simultaneously with both problems that are likely
to bias our OLS coefficients, namely the heterogeneity of students and possible endogeneity of
teachers’ wages. So our aim now is to determine to whom teachers’ wages matter in Brazil (QR),
but using as explanatory variable a “corrected” regressor (2SLS/IV approach).
This  combination  of  quantile  regression  with  two-stage  least  squares  is  called  two-stage  least
absolute deviation (2SLAD). Levin (2001) and Billger (2002) have recently applied it in education
production  functions,  for  example.  The  consistency  and  asymptotic  normality  of  the  2SLAD18
estimator has been shown by Amemiya (1982), Powell (1983) and Chen (1996).
The procedure consists of regressing the endogenous variables (teachers wages) on all instruments
(including the predetermined ones) in the first stage through ordinary least squares, and then use the
fitted values from the first stage as a regressor in the second-stage quantile regression estimation.
So our next step is to estimate the effects of our instrument (wagehat) on student achievement for
different points in the test score distribution using 5 quantiles of the test score distribution (0.05,
0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.95) in the second step of our model.
6.1. 2SLAD results (combining QR with 2SLS)
Tables  10  (language)  and  11  (mathematics)  show  2SLAD  estimations  results  for  5  quantiles,
including a series of control variables. For each subject, we present results for all schools taken
together and for each type of school and we reproduce 2SLS coefficients for comparison.
The results for mathematics are not quite reliable for the reasons outlined in section 5.2. Moreover,
few coefficients can be considered statistically different from zero at usual levels of confidence.
As for the language exam, the results we obtain are similar to those obtained using plain quantile
regression: the effect of teachers wages decreases (though not monotonically) with the performance
of students, both when all schools are taken together, and when only private schools are picked.
This strengthens our former conclusion that teacher quality excluding university education mostly
benefits lower performing pupils. Detention of a university degree by the teacher again only affects
student test scores in language of the best pupils in private schools. The picture is not very clear for
public schools, since there are no significant coefficients.
7.  Summary and conclusions
Using a more flexible  functional  form with respect to the ones that are commonly used  in the
economics of education literature, we investigated whether there is a correlation between teachers’
wages and students' achievement in a developing country, Brazil.
We essentially tested three hypotheses in this paper:
(i)  that  teachers  wages,  an  important  and  expensive  educational  input,  matter  for  students
achievement,
(ii)  that the conditional correlation of teachers wages and scores is stronger in private than in
public schools, given that the latter are imposed a greater number of constraints on their
recruitment and payment policies, and19
(iii)  that there are variations in the conditional correlation of teachers wages with students test
scores, suggesting the existence of heterogeneity in the pupil-teacher relationship in Brazil.
All our results using the language sample support all three hypotheses:
(i)  on average, teachers wages do have a significant effect on students test scores, although the
coefficients are quite small,
(ii)  private  schools  (in  which,  typically  rich  families  enroll  their  children),  coefficients  for
teachers  wages  are  positive,  significant,  and  higher  than  public  schools  and  all-schools
coefficients,
(iii)  the achievement impact of an additional unit of teacher wage is not the same for all types of
student:  the  positive  effect  of  teacher  quality  (as  measured  by  teacher  wage)  is  most
important  for  low-performing  pupils.  These  results  are  preserved  when  we  correct  for
potential  endogeneity  of  teacher  wages  using  instrumental  variables  and  two-stage  least
absolute deviation, reinforcing the credibility of the results. Nonetheless, the coefficients of
IV and 2SLAD generally turn out to be less precise than their OLS and QR counterparts.
In mathematics, our OLS results suggest that teachers’ wages do matter for student performance,
and  they  are  more  pronounced  in  private  schools.  QR  results  also  provide  evidences  of
heterogeneity, since estimated coefficients are different across quantiles (coefficients for extreme
quantiles are not significant while coefficients for intermediary quantiles are). However, we can not
identify a decreasing pattern as clear as in language. OLS and QR results are not repeated in the
2SLS and 2SLAD estimations.
To the contrary, detention of a university degree by the teacher mainly improves the performance
of the best pupils. This result seems to indicate that only the best pupils are able to reap the benefits
of having a university trained teacher. All other unobserved aspects of teacher quality, captured by
the wages,  mainly  benefit  the  low-performing  students  pointing  to  some  form  of  merit  pay  or
efficient selection of teacher candidates especially in the private sector.
It is not clear from our evidences which particular characteristic of private schools is responsible
for the link found between teacher wage and pupil achievement in Brazil. The relation could point
to a better functioning of the market in the private school sector, but also to the use of merit pay to
a larger extent as compared to the public sector. The latter explanation has been investigated in the
literature on merit pay in the US and it appears that failure to use merit pay in the public sector is
mainly due to specific circumstances such as the opposition of teacher unions (Ballou, 2001).
A puzzling issue is why the results we obtain for teachers wages become so different from one
subject  to  the  other  when  we  instrument  teachers  wages.  These  differences  may  be  due  to20
differences  in  the  nature  of  pupil-teacher  relationship  or  due  to  different  labor  market
characteristics, such as the gender composition of teachers’ population. In fact, an instrument such
as  teachers’  gender  was  likely  to  be  endogenous  in  mathematics,  while  being  exogenous  in
language. The gender of the mathematics teacher seems to have a direct  impact on scores (not
through the channel of his or her wages). Understanding why this is so, as well as investigating
whether this result is also true for other Brazilian data sets or, more generally, for other countries,
are topics that require further research.
Finally, it should be mentioned that we do not have the ambition to claim that our results provide a
strong causal relationship between teachers’ wages and students’ scores. But we do claim that our
results  contain  some  insightful  descriptive  static  (cross-section)  evidence  of  the  relationship
between these two variables, since we used a great number of controls across the estimations, and
different econometric techniques. In any case, a possible path for further research is to test our three
hypotheses  again  by  using  different  strategies  of  identification,  one  of  which  could  consist  of
exploiting pseudo-panel features of the SAEB datasets, such as Menezes-Filho & Pazzello (2004).21
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics and estimation results
Table 1: Descriptive statistics, Language, 8th grade, 2001.
All schools Private Schools Municipal schools State Schools
Mean Std,
Dev,
Mean Std, Dev, Mean Std, Dev, Mean Std, Dev,
Dependent variables Ntscore 244,84 51,39 276,12 46,37 227,00 45,78 227,91 45,24
Score 500 100
Ntwageprof 5,04 3,16 5,99 3,66 4,74 3,05 4,32 2,33
Teacher Variables Genderprof 0,17 0,38
Hoursprof 116,00 46,13 118,00 47,27 120,40 46,21 110,27 44,24
Expprof 3,36 1,18
Otherwork 0,16 0,37
Univprof 0,90 0,30 0,95 0,21 0,89 0,31 0,86 0,35
Alterwage 8,17 3,31
Pupil characteristics Gender 0,46 0,50
Age 15,04 1,66
Black 0,07 0,26 0,03 0,18 0,10 0,30 0,08 0,28
Mixed 0,38 0,48
Retention 0,57 0,85 0,24 0,58 0,77 0,93 0,75 0,92
Hmwk 1,93 0,98
Family variables Misced 3,25 1,22 4,17 0,92 2,64 1,03 2,81 1,07
Nonnuclear 0,36 0,48 0,27 0,44 0,41 0,49 0,41 0,49
N_maids 0,59 1,00
Nbooks 1,49 0,68
School variables Wageprinc 0,00 1,00
Library 0,81 0,39 0,91 0,29 0,73 0,44 0,79 0,41
Air 0,83 0,38
Light 0,92 0,27
Ncomp 10,94 17,26 22,75 22,19 4,57 7,57 3,27 6,30
Stratio 35,73 9,90
Private 0,36 0,48
Local tax variable Taxpercap 101,15 99,87 113,12 102,65 101,91 100,99 88,40 94,37
Number of observations 50492 18015 14776 17701
Short description of variables: ntscore non transformed pupil test scores, ntwageprof: non transformed teacher wages,
hoursprof: number of hours working as a teacher per month, expprof: number of years of experience, otherwork:
dummy value 1 if teacher has another job on the side, univprof:dummy indicating whether teacher went to university,
alterwage: potential alternative wage given gender, education and state, Age:pupil's age in years, black and mixed: self
declared ethnic origin, retention: number of times pupil repeated a class, Hmwk: frequency with which the pupil does
his homework, misced: level of education attained by the mother, nonnuclear: dummy of value 1 if family if parents are
separated, n_maids: number of maids, Nbooks: number of books at home, wageprinc: wage of school director, library:
dummy indicating presence of a library in school, air/light: dummies indicating whether the classroom is light and airy
enough, ncomp:number of computers available for pupil use, stratio: student/teacher ratio, private : dummy indicating
private management of schools, taxpercap: tex per capita perceived in the municipality.24
Table 2: Descriptive statistics, Mathematics, 8th grade, 2001.
All schools State schools Municipal Schools Private Schools
Mean Std, Dev Mean Std, Dev Mean Std, Dev Mean Std, Dev
Dependent variables Ntscore 253,86 53,76 232,34 41,82 232,80 42,97 292,24 50,74
Score 500 100
Ntwageprof 5,27 3,44 4,37 2,53 4,73 3,29 6,54 3,89
Teacher variables Genderprof 0,57 0,50





Pupil characteristics Gender 0,48 0,50
Idade 15,03 1,66
Black 0,07 0,26 0,09 0,29 0,11 0,31 0,04 0,18
Mixed 0,38 0,48
Retention 0,58 0,87 0,77 0,94 0,77 0,94 0,24 0,58
Hmwk1 1,88 0,99
Family variables Misced 3,26 1,22 2,82 1,07 2,64 1,02 4,18 0,92
Nonnuclear 0,36 0,48 0,40 0,49 0,40 0,49 0,27 0,44
N_maids 0,59 1,00
Nbooks 1,49 0,68
School Variables Wageprinc 0,00 1,00
Library 0,82 0,39 0,79 0,41 0,73 0,44 0,91 0,29
Air 0,83 0,38
Light 0,92 0,27
Ncomp 10,95 17,25 3,29 6,33 4,58 7,58 22,74 22,15
Stratio 35,74 9,89 37,43 8,97 35,25 9,34 34,48 10,91
Private 0,36 0,48
Local tax variable Taxpercap 101,27 100,00 88,51 94,59 101,98 101,071 113,28 102,71
Number of observations 50300 17630 14709 1796125
Table 3: OLS results, Language, 8
th grade, by type of school.
Dependent variable: Student test scores
All Schools Private Schools Municipal Schools State Schools
Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err,
Wageprof 3,30*** 0,58 6,99*** 1,12 0,53 1,19 0,79 1,12
Univprof 7,93*** 1,76 13,20** 4,24 16,18*** 3,68 2,11 2,98
Gender -15,24*** 0,95 -20,89*** 1,73 -12,55*** 1,94 -16,39*** 1,86
Idade 15,27** 5,51 70,44*** 13,84 7,02 10,75 7,54 10,52
Idade2 -0,72*** 0,17 -2,60*** 0,46 -0,53 0,33 -0,51 0,33
Black -15,55*** 1,93 -21,56*** 4,91 -18,53*** 3,40 -11,89** 3,49
Mixed -4,13*** 1,03 -5,74** 1,99 -5,63** 2,05 -1,38 1,93
Retention -31,24*** 1,76 -50,98*** 4,34 -22,71*** 3,24 -32,18*** 3,13
Retention2 8,53*** 0,67 11,36*** 1,94 5,70*** 1,19 9,61*** 1,16
Hmwk1 23,43*** 1,90 21,46*** 3,81 25,38*** 3,73 27,75*** 3,55
Hmwk12 -4,68*** 0,53 -4,24*** 1,03 -4,93*** 1,05 -5,55*** 1,00
Misced -1,85 2,25 5,57 6,03 -0,29 4,63 -0,27 4,37
Misced2 1,32*** 0,35 0,37 0,82 0,92 0,79 1,29* 0,72
Nonnuclear -13,84*** 1,00 -18,17*** 1,97 -11,23*** 1,96 -15,17*** 1,86
N_maids -1,87 2,05 4,59* 2,78 -19,45** 6,14 -20,11*** 5,74
N_maids2 1,75* 0,77 0,08 1,02 7,51** 2,37 7,73** 2,26
Nbooks 24,10*** 4,40 21,46** 6,88 29,94* 11,89 46,20*** 10,26
Nbooks2 -3,86** 1,16 -2,86* 1,73 -5,67* 3,36 -10,14*** 2,86
Wageprinc 4,13*** 0,70 5,58*** 1,23 6,21*** 1,76 4,98** 1,80
Wageprinc2 -0,49 0,56 0,15 0,97 -6,37*** 1,25 2,55* 1,54
Library 3,45** 1,28 2,43 3,05 5,36* 2,39 6,86** 2,40
Private 37,88*** 1,53
Air -1,85 1,45 1,09 3,76 -3,82 2,76 -0,99 2,56
Light 3,55* 1,97 3,30 6,16 5,34 3,92 2,72 3,12
Ncomp 0,49*** 0,07 0,34** 0,12 0,55* 0,32 0,73* 0,38
Ncomp2 0,00*** 0,00 0,00* 0,00 0,01 0,01 -0,03 0,02
Stratio -0,13 0,23 -0,16 0,36 -0,05 0,52 0,35 0,56
Stratio2 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 -0,01 0,01
Taxpercap 0,15*** 0,02 0,18*** 0,04 0,02 0,04 0,20*** 0,03
Taxpercap2 0,00*** 0,00 0,00*** 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00** 0,00
Constant 371,01*** 44,15 -47,20 106,34 442,68*** 87,05 452,15*** 84,86
State dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0,34 0,22 0,20 0,17
Number of obs 29015 10400 8500 1011526
Table 4: OLS results, Mathematics, 8th grade, by type of school.
Dependent variable: Student test scores
All schools Private Schools Municipal Schools State Schools
Score Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Wageprof 2,38*** 0,59 4,02*** 1,11 -0,73 1,27 3,14** 1,18
Univprof 1,62 1,51 8,52* 3,53 -0,10 3,19 -0,12 2,84
Gender 26,49*** 0,90 24,85*** 1,70 36,87*** 1,95 36,54*** 1,86
Idade -10,36* 5,28 31,31* 13,59 -13,60 11,02 -21,26* 10,58
Idade2 0,07 0,17 -1,41** 0,45 0,07 0,34 0,33 0,33
Black -21,04*** 1,80 -29,30*** 4,79 -23,43*** 3,37 -22,73*** 3,41
Mixed -7,81*** 0,98 -8,94*** 1,93 -7,11** 2,08 -8,97*** 1,96
Retention -29,99*** 1,68 -54,00*** 4,26 -29,12*** 3,26 -26,53*** 3,16
Retention2 8,28*** 0,64 12,68*** 1,89 8,66*** 1,21 7,17*** 1,17
Hmwk1 17,70*** 1,79 14,01*** 3,60 21,89*** 3,77 18,71*** 3,57
Hmwk12 -3,24*** 0,50 -1,84* 0,98 -3,91*** 1,06 -3,73*** 1,01
Misced -8,27*** 2,16 3,48 6,02 -8,63* 4,69 3,61 4,48
Misced2 2,45*** 0,34 1,02 0,81 2,52** 0,80 0,56 0,74
Nonnuclear -15,95*** 0,95 -22,73*** 1,93 -15,42*** 1,99 -15,50*** 1,88
N_maids 8,52*** 1,96 13,05*** 2,74 -1,64 6,18 -7,85 5,73
N_maids2 -1,72* 0,74 -3,23** 1,01 1,97 2,41 4,30* 2,24
Nbooks 30,18*** 4,20 32,78*** 6,73 43,32*** 12,17 51,56*** 10,37
Nbooks2 -5,44*** 1,11 -5,81** 1,70 -9,08** 3,46 -11,32*** 2,89
Wageprinc 4,62*** 0,68 7,82*** 1,21 4,10* 1,78 3,98* 1,87
Wageprinc2 0,50 0,54 0,22 0,94 -4,54*** 1,26 3,46* 1,60
Library 2,23* 1,23 2,23 3,08 7,95** 2,42 4,27* 2,44
Private 45,48*** 1,45
Air -2,84* 1,40 -6,89* 3,75 0,42 2,90 -0,84 2,56
Light 5,35** 1,93 14,68* 6,16 6,23 4,17 4,21 3,18
Ncomp 0,75*** 0,07 0,79*** 0,11 0,25 0,32 -0,05 0,39
Ncomp2 0,00*** 0,00 -0,01*** 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,02
Stratio -0,27 0,21 -0,67* 0,32 0,28 0,54 0,24 0,56
Stratio2 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,01 0,01 -0,01 0,01
Taxpercap 0,09*** 0,02 0,15*** 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,12*** 0,03
Taxpercap2 0,00*** 0,00 0,00** 0,00 0,00* 0,00 0,00 0,00
Constant 554,6 229,75 595,74 653,26
State
dummies?
Yes Yes Yes Yes
R squared 0,44 0,29 0,24 0,21
Number of
Obs
28484 10279 8500 970527
Table 5: Chow test of structural change
.“Sometimes called Chow test for structural change” (cf. Hayashi, 2000: 79).
(Ho: coefficients of additional variables on each unrestricted model = 0)
Language Mathematics
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2
unrestricted score = f(W, X, X²) score = f(W, W², X, X²) score = f(W, X, X²) score = f(W, W², X, X²)
restricted score = f(W, X) score = f(W, X, X²) score = f(W, X) score = f(W, X, X²)
F ratio 32,31 0,02 35,72 1,17
p-value 0 0,88 0 0,28
Decision Ho rejected Ho not rejected Ho rejected Ho not rejected
Conclusion Unrestricted is better Restricted is better Unrestricted is better Restricted is better
Chosen specification: Score = f(W, X²) Score = f(W, X²)
W = teachers' wages
X = all other variables
W² = the square of teachers' wages
X² = the square of all other variables
Table 6: Quantile regression and OLS, Language, 8
th grade.
OLS Q.05 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.95
All schools Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err,
Wageprof 3,30*** 0,58 5,14*** 1,39 3,52*** 0,79 2,84*** 0,67 2,95*** 0,77 0,74 1,04
Univprof 7,93*** 1,76 7,32* 4,07 8,43*** 2,34 6,96** 2,01 7,09** 2,33 11,55*** 3,22
Private Schools
Zwprofpriv 6,99*** 1,12 14,39*** 3,00 6,44*** 1,47 5,35*** 1,38 5,49*** 1,41 2,85 1,94
Univprof 13,20** 4,24 17,60 10,91 12,58* 5,48 7,17 5,22 7,31 5,39 16,61* 7,89
Municipal Schools
Zwprofmun 0,53 1,19 -1,66 2,72 -0,05 1,76 -0,05 1,50 2,16 1,37 -0,71 2,17
Univprof 16,18*** 3,68 16,41* 8,28 17,47** 5,44 16,31*** 4,63 10,60* 4,19 9,45 7,10
State Schools
Zwprofest 0,79 1,12 3,15 2,33 3,10* 1,41 2,16 1,55 -1,87 1,56 -5,96** 2,26
Univprof 2,11 2,98 -2,83 6,47 3,47 3,75 1,78 4,13 7,79* 4,19 5,79 6,15
Table 7: Quantile regression and OLS, Mathematics, 8
th grade.
OLS Q.05 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.95
All schools Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err,
Wageprof 2,38*** 0,59 2,21* 1,24 2,16** 0,77 2,95*** 0,71 2,23** 0,71 2,97* 1,22
Univprof 1,62 1,51 -1,91 2,86 2,68 1,92 2,05 1,83 1,5 1,87 1,34 3,3
Private Schools
Zwprofpriv 4,02*** 1,11 4,57 2,95 5** 1,67 4,78*** 1,31 3,69** 1,34 0,65 1,99
Univprof 8,52* 3,53 1,81 8,51 12,09* 5,1 7,38* 4,16 9,61* 4,35 16,46** 6,27
Municipal Schools
Zwprofmun -0,73 1,27 0,54 2,39 1,28 1,76 -1,12 1,54 -2,19 2,05 -1,23 2,61
Univprof -0,10 3,19 3,29 5,4 1,32 4,27 -3,09 3,87 -3,52 5,35 7,28 7,18
State Schools
Zwprofest 3,14** 1,18 0,05 2,02 1,69 1,69 4,01** 1,23 1,69 1,58 5,83* 3,2
Univprof -0,12 2,84 -4,1 4,57 -0,92 4 -0,42 2,97 2,97 3,86 2,57 7,9928
Table 8: 2SLS results, Language, 8
th grade.









Gendprof 0,18*** 0,01 0,19*** 0,02 0,15*** 0,02 0,08*** 0,02
Hoursprof 0,007*** 0,0005 0,01*** 0,00 0,0005 0,001 -0,004*** 0,00
Hoursprof2 -10e-5*** 0,00 3x10e-5*** 0,00 0,0005* 0,00 4x10e-5*** 0,00
Expprof 0,15*** 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,42*** 0,04 -0,02 0,04
Expprof2 0,005 0,003 0,02** 0,005 -0,03*** 0,01 0,04*** 0,005
Otherwork -0,09*** 0,01 -0,14*** 0,02 -0,08*** 0,02 -0,09*** 0,02
Adjusted R-squared 0,4742 0,5256 0,4721 0,4779
Partial R-squared 0,1513 0,1606 0,1455 0,1821
F, p-value 848,07 0,000 324,66 0,000 236,710 0,000 367,77 0,000
Main equation
(test scores) Coef, Std,
Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std,
Err, Coef, Std,
Err,
Wageprof 4,20** 1,52 8,30** 2,81 3,44 3,14 -0,61 2,64
Univprof 7,63*** 1,90 11,8** 4,37 15,83*** 3,95 2,49 3,44
R-squared 0,34 0,22 0,20 0,17
Overid test: Sargan
statistic and p-value
5,121 0,40 6,245 0,28 5,941 0,31 21,673 0,0006
Number of
observations 28605 10238 8397 9970
Table 9: 2SLS results, Mathematics, 8
th grade.









Genderprof 0,11*** 0,009 0,17*** 0,02 0,12*** 0,02 0,035* 0,015
Hoursprof 0,004*** 0,0005 0,004*** 0,00 0,005*** 0,0009 0,003** 0,0009
Hoursprof2 3x10e-6* 0,00 2x10e-6 0,00 5x10e-6 4x10e-6 8x10e-6* 4x10e-6
Expprof 0,035* 0,02 0,07* 0,035 -0,08* 0,04 -0,016 0,034
Expprof2 0,02*** 0,003 0,006 0,005 0,04*** 0,005 0,03*** 0,005
Otherwork -0,12*** 0,01 -0,05** 0,02 -0,15*** 0,02 -0,2*** 0,02
Adjusted R-squared 0,5180 0,5013 0,5657 0,49
Partial R-squared 0,1527 0,1246 0,1751 0,1844
F, p-value 837,23 0,000 238,08 0,000 293,34 0,000 355,66 0,000
Main equation
(test scores) Coef, Std,
Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std,
Err, Coef, Std,
Err,
Wageprof 0,30 1,51 -2,64 3,17 0,44 3,13 2,14 2,75
Univprof 2,42 1,63 10,74** 3,66 0,86 3,42 -1,15 3,16
R-squared 0,44 0,29 0,24 0,21
Overid test: Sargan
statistic and p-value
9,623 0,09 11,495 0,04 8,985 0,11 18,393 0,002
Number of
observations 27942 10095 8350 949729
Table 10: Quantile regression and 2SLS (2SLAD), Language, 8
th grade.
2SLS Q.05 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.95
All schools Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err,
Wageprof 4,20** 1,52 10,89** 3,63 5,08* 2,22 3,67* 1,87 2,77 1,89 -2,1 2,78
Univprof 7,63*** 1,90 6,53 4,47 7,48** 2,77 7,1** 2,33 8** 2,35 13,8*** 3,48
Private Schools
Zwprofpriv 8,30** 2,81 17,89* 8 10,92** 3,91 5,08 3,86 4,50 3,54 -4,16 4,85
Univprof 11,8** 4,37 18,37 12,65 10,11* 6,2 4,33 5,98 5,55 5,45 19,55* 7,61
Municipal Schools
Zwprofmun 3,44 3,14 10,25 7,12 4,22 4,36 0,50 3,87 4,64 4,06 0,18 6,29
Univprof 15,83*** 3,95 8,18 9,04 15,98** 5,54 15,22** 4,83 12,53* 5 9,19 7,77
State Schools
Zwprofest -0,61 2,64 -5,48 5,38 1,45 3,7 3,49 3,76 -1,59 3,59 -3,82 5,82
Univprof 2,49 3,44 -0,76 7,19 4,38 4,74 0,06 4,89 7,24 4,65 3,63 7,46
Table 11: Quantile regression and 2SLS (2SLAD), Mathematics, 8
th grade.
2SLS Q.05 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.95
All schools Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err, Coef, Std, Err,
Wageprof 0,30 1,51 -4,48 2,85 -1 2,08 3,76* 1,93 1,98 1,85 -2,79 3,26
Univprof 2,42 1,63 0,59 2,98 3,73* 2,21 1,88 2,08 2,03 2 3,23 3,6
Private Schools
Zwprofpriv -2,64 3,17 -9,81 8,61 -5,58 4,75 -0,42 3,9 2,1 4,03 -5,25 5,59
Univprof 10,74** 3,66 13,44 9,29 14,57** 5,51 9,57* 4,50 10,32* 4,72 17,6** 6,6
Municipal Schools
Zwprofmun 0,44 3,13 -0,4 5,69 0,70 4,33 4,70 4,16 2,68 4,76 -5,19 7,39
Univprof 0,86 3,42 7,75 5,85 3,09 4,77 -4,11 4,68 -6,79 5,645 7,36 8,65
State Schools
Zwprofest 2,14 2,75 -8,28* 4,53 0,63 3,86 7,13* 3,43 2,37 3,39 -6,26 6,75
Univprof -1,15 3,16 -0,33 5,05 -2,17 4,36 -3,67 3,93 1,06 3,91 3,04 7,8630
Appendix 2: Computation of wages variables
1.From 'reais' to an index: Categories of gross monthly wages of principals and teachers, which
were originally expressed in Brazilian currency (1 real, 2 reais...), have been transformed by us into
categories of an index used by Brazilian administration, the so-called 'salário mínimo' (sm used as
shorthand; in English, it means ‘minimum wage’). We used the ratio 1sm = 180,00 reais, which
corresponded in October 2001, when data was collected, to about 68 US dollars.
2. Attributing values to the categories: We have then attributed a value to each category of wage.
For example, category 1 was 'up to R180,00 reais'. In step 1, this has been converted into 'up to
1sm'. In step 2, the value 0,5 has been attributed to every observation in this category, such that the
wage is now 0,5 sm. The variables created have been called ‘ntwageprof’ (teachers’ wages, present
in tables 1 and 2) and ‘ntwageprinc’ (principals’ wages).
3.  Standardization  of  gross  monthly  wages:  Finally,  in  order to  make  the  interpretation  of  the
coefficients straightforward, we standardized the variables created in step 2 above, with a mean of 0
and  a  standard  deviation  of  1,  and  called  them  wageprof  (teachers’  wage)  and  wageprinc
(principals’ wage). These variables are used in our estimations.Département des Sciences Économiques
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